This is very typical for a med-crewmember to throw the pilot under the bus...
I am a pilot, and I will be the first to tell you he should have landed and remained on the ground.

What is typical of this case is this, the med-crewmember has issues with this pilot and will use a situation like this to vindicate her/his issues with the pilot.

It also sounds like this program may not be practicing safety properly. Have they ever heard the "Three to Go, one to stay rule". this also applies in flight, "Three to continue, one to land / return.

This should be briefed daily and undrstood by all crewmembers that this will be practiced, I have turned around a few times at the request of a crewmember, I have turnded down a flight at the request of a crew member. I think this is a program problem and not a pilot problem

I appreciate your concern, but your post comes across as combative, judgmental, pilot bashing disguised as professional safety concerns.

1. "... fairly new pilot with a lot of second seat hours in a blackhawk but not many in a single engine EMS heli."

This doesn't need to be said since you really don't know all the details of a pilot's past experience and therefore, you don't determine if a pilot is qualified to fly the program any more than a pilot decides if a nurse is qualified to be in the program. This is irrelevant unless you are trying to set someone up.

2. "...After about 15 minutes of following lights with another 30 minutes or more to go, the pilot decided to turn away from the lights towards where he Knew a small town airport was and we immediately were inadvertent."

Now, unless you have personally debriefed the pilot and know what he or she was thinking, your presumption to know the reason for an inflight decision is merely speculative. This may have been a reasonable decision (You know, from a purely pragmatic position, everyone is alive so it couldn't be all bad).

Further, if a pilot in a VFR helicopter got you safely out of a truly inadvertent IMC situation, I think a thank-you might be in order. (As an aside, you could have been IMC but my experience has been that many crew members sitting in the back, or sometimes even in the front seat, cannot accurately tell if the aircraft is inadvertent IMC or not.)

3. "...I had no idea where we were and I was pretty sure the pilot didn't either." How is it that you were sure the pilot didn't know where they were? Since you said that there was an extensive debrief, the extent of pilot disorientation would have been a major topic so you wouldn't have to say, "I was pretty sure." Based on the extensive debrief, you should be able to unequivocally say, "the pilot didn't know." Why appear to default to the "pilot error" paradigm.

4. "... He would get close then move saying I am gonna try to get us closer to a road which he thought was there, none of us could see. He landed twice and moved twice. After the second time I insisted he land and stay put after expressing my significant discomfort multiple times. On his third landing I called the lead pilot on my cell phone and put it up to the pilots ear so he could here the "DON'T MOVE IT AGAIN" and I opened my door telling him I was standing on the skids and not moving until he shut down. This time we could see a road (barely) about 20 yards away and he was going to move it again attempting to get closer to the road."

You talk about a road "which he thought was there" (as if he was confused) and low and behold, you say that there was a road there that he wanted to hover toward; It turns out that he didn't "think" there was a road there, there was a road there and you were wrong. Is it possible that you could be wrong? You say that none of you could see the road which obviously, the pilot could see... then you expect your assessment of inadvertent IMC to be taken for fact?

You say you could see 60 feet to the road, which means that, by your assertion, there could have been more than enough visibility to hover at 3 feet closer to the road. You may not know this, but most pilots can hover a helicopter safely with only some ground clutter visible in the chin bubble and there was obviously a lot more visibility than that.

5. "...I didn't want to push the luck we already had."
Apparently, it never occurred to you for one second that perhaps the skill of the pilot got you that far; No, you say it had to be simply luck. Could it be that you were unwilling to recognize the skill of another team member? It sounds like you are trying to justify your position by standing on their shoulders.

6. "... Unfortunately this pilot was later involved in a injury crash in that aircraft." What does that have to do with this incident? That is completely irrelevant. Was it the same situation? Why do you even need to say that unless you are trying to bash the pilot?

Please hear what I'm saying.

I believe you were truly scared (been there, done that). Further, I believe that you needed to speak up, forcibly if necessary. In that regard, if the pilot was going to move the aircraft 20 yards and you were on the ground, you could have even told them that you were so uncomfortable, you were getting out which would have been a strong, and reasonable message.

No, you had to call the chief pilot on the phone. You had enough time to make a phone call. So how much time did you have to forcibly, but rationally and professionally make a case to the PIC who was obviously in a stressful aviation environment?

The pilot could have made some bad decisions and I hear that you learned something from this, but let me tell you what the pilots may have learned; "If there is a problem in flight, the medical crew members will be the first one to throw them under the bus."

jj

Epilogue?
Let me give you a story:
A pilot is flying a single engine VFR helicopter at night in marginal weather to an airport. The weather ahead really looks iffy. This aircraft has a lot better visibility than the twins he is used to flying so he is very comfortable with the situation but he believes that it could get worse ahead.

Rather than take a chance, he decides to be safe and since he has reasonable VFR now and has a clear place to land that is not far from a road, he makes a decision and turns. In the midst of this difficult decision and the stress of the operation, the flight nurse in the back is critiquing his decision and talking about their comfort level.

There is not much he can do about that now and just wishes that they would keep the aircraft a little more sterile so he can make his approach and landing to the middle of the clear area where he knows there are no obstructions. He knows it's far from the road, but he figures that if he needs to, after he lands, he might be able to reposition the aircraft.

After the emotional release, there is a nurse in the back who tells him again that they are really uncomfortable in this situation. In the realm of cosmic significance, the pilot hears the nurse but knows that there is nothing else he can do other than complete the landing.

He makes the landing and after all this stress, decides to reposition the helicopter closer to the road which is easy to see. It's not a big deal because the area is very clear but he figures that his fellow crew members, since he is just hovering, will help him with clearance. He might need to move it twice just to be safe.

Then he gets a door open light and a flight nurse while he is at the controls, the flight nurse is handing him a cell phone.

Now, this is purely a fictitious but can you see how things can be presented to present a egocentric position rather than an objective team-safety consensus.